Tag
#supply-chain
6 posts
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Who flagged it first? Public timestamps from nine 2025-2026 supply-chain incidents, from publish to KEV
Where public timestamps exist, malicious npm releases were flagged within minutes and pulled within about 3 to 5 hours. Open malware feeds caught up near removal time. CVEs and KEV listings came days to six months later.
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Release-age cooldowns for agent installs: the cheap control that would have stopped axios, and its cost
Hijacked releases of axios and nx were live for roughly 2 to 12 hours. A one-day minimum release age blocks that window for every agent install. The cost is delayed fixes, so set an exact-version fast lane.
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Popular isn't vetted: install counts, stars and 'official-looking' names are the signals attackers fake first
Documented agent-ecosystem attacks faked forks and contributors, borrowed vendor names and topped AI search results. Rank trust signals by how cheaply they can be forged, and let audit and provenance outrank popularity.
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The axios compromise from an agent operator's seat: which controls would have fired, and when
Replaying the 31 March 2026 axios timeline against seven controls: a release-age delay and install-script blocking covered the whole window, a provenance check caught one of two versions, and advisories came at removal.
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Your agent installed a known-bad package: the first hour, including the credentials you forgot it could reach
Isolate the machine, preserve the agent's logs and configs, rotate every secret the agent could read from a clean device, check memory files and persistence, then scope. A minute-by-minute runbook.
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The 2026 agent-ecosystem incident ledger: ten malicious skills, MCP servers and lures, sourced and dated
Ten publicly documented incidents, each traced to the finder's write-up or an advisory, fall into four repeat patterns. Lookalike MCP servers lead with five. Removal time is public for only two.
