Author
Margot Reyes
Data journalist · threat.cafe editorial persona
Fictional profile.
Margot builds the datasets behind threat.cafe's reporting and states the denominator, the source and the limits next to every number. A fictional writer persona; articles are researched and fact-checked by the threat.cafe editors.
Writes on
- threat.cafe 10
10 posts
-
Who flagged it first? Public timestamps from nine 2025-2026 supply-chain incidents, from publish to KEV
Where public timestamps exist, malicious npm releases were flagged within minutes and pulled within about 3 to 5 hours. Open malware feeds caught up near removal time. CVEs and KEV listings came days to six months later.
-
Six agent-security indicators a CISO can report every quarter without vanity metrics
Report coverage, checked-install share, unknown-artifact rate, time to answer "are we exposed?", canary pass rate and approval-tier mix. Each has a numerator, a denominator and a data source you already own.
-
Shadow AI's $670,000: how to read IBM's breach-cost figure before it goes into your budget request
The $670,000 is an average cost gap between breached organisations with high and low shadow-AI use, from a 600-organisation study of 2024-25 breaches. It supports prioritisation, not a savings claim, and a newer edition is out.
-
Is OSV enough for agent artifacts? Measuring how many malicious MCP servers and skills appear in open malicious-package data
Of 10 documented agent-ecosystem incidents, 6 appear in the OpenSSF malicious-packages data. All 6 shipped through npm. None of the skill-store or GitHub-hosted incidents do, because OSV has no identifier for them.
-
Small firms are 96% of ransomware victims: why MSPs should rank agent-running developer machines first
DBIR 2026, as summarised by CRI, puts small firms at 96% of ransomware victims, with 73% of victims hit by stolen credentials first. MSPs should rank client machines by the credentials they hold, and agent-running dev laptops hold the most.
-
The official MCP Registry has no security fields: what a registry listing does and doesn't tell you
An MCP Registry listing proves a publisher controls a namespace and, for packages, the package. It does not prove review, safe code, or control of a remote URL. The schema has no security field at all.
-
The intel commons is rationed: what abuse.ch, VirusTotal, NVD and MS-ISAC changes mean for teams built on free
Between November 2024 and April 2026, four sources small teams treat as free added mandatory authentication, non-commercial tiers, paid membership or triage. Free intel now costs accounts, terms reviews and fallbacks.
-
What one compromised developer laptop costs in the agent era: a P10/P50/P90 model you can adapt
A model built on public wage data puts the internal response cost of one agent-related laptop compromise at about $2,000 to $46,000. What moves it toward a claim is whether a stolen credential is used before rotation.
-
Why agent-security statistics disagree: a source-lineage audit of the MCP and skills numbers vendors quote
We traced ten widely quoted MCP and skills statistics to their origins. Most measure different things on different populations; two have no traceable source. A register with a safe-to-cite verdict for each.
-
The 2026 agent-ecosystem incident ledger: ten malicious skills, MCP servers and lures, sourced and dated
Ten publicly documented incidents, each traced to the finder's write-up or an advisory, fall into four repeat patterns. Lookalike MCP servers lead with five. Removal time is public for only two.
