Tag
#npm
4 posts
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Valid provenance, malicious package: what npm trusted publishing does and doesn't protect your agents from
Trusted publishing removes stored publish tokens, and provenance proves where a package was built. Neither says the code is benign. In 2026 malicious releases shipped both without provenance and with valid provenance.
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Slopsquatting when no human types the name: what changes for package policy once agents choose and install dependencies
Most hallucinated package names are not typos, and many repeat, so typo checks miss them. When an agent installs on its own, check existence, age and known-bad status before the install runs.
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Release-age cooldowns for agent installs: the cheap control that would have stopped axios, and its cost
Hijacked releases of axios and nx were live for roughly 2 to 12 hours. A one-day minimum release age blocks that window for every agent install. The cost is delayed fixes, so set an exact-version fast lane.
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The axios compromise from an agent operator's seat: which controls would have fired, and when
Replaying the 31 March 2026 axios timeline against seven controls: a release-age delay and install-script blocking covered the whole window, a provenance check caught one of two versions, and advisories came at removal.
