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7 posts

  1. · Nadia Ferreira-Strand · Agent artifact supply chain · on threat.cafe

    You can't govern what you can't list: an inventory of skills, MCP servers and hooks across developer laptops

    Agent add-ons live in per-user JSON files and folders that MDM, EDR and SIEM do not parse. Build the inventory from those files on every laptop and every checkout. Config-path map dated 15 October 2026, plus a collection script.

  2. · Tobias Lindqvist-Rao · Enforcement architecture · on threat.cafe

    Five Claude Code hook settings that quietly turn agent enforcement into advice

    Exit 1 does not block. A timed-out hook does not block. The if filter is best-effort. Plugin tools carry prefixed names. User hooks merge in unless managed-only mode is on. Check all five before you call a hook a control.

  3. · Tobias Lindqvist-Rao · Original research and datasets · on threat.cafe

    Do coding agents call optional security tools on their own? What the docs guarantee, and a 50-task test to run

    Nothing in the MCP spec or Claude Code's docs makes an agent call a security-check tool before it installs something. The model decides. Here is why, and a pre-registered 50-task protocol to measure it on your own setup.

  4. · Nadia Ferreira-Strand · Enforcement architecture · on threat.cafe

    Prove your agent policy fires: a harmless canary suite for Claude Code hooks and MCP allowlists

    Several hook and allowlist settings fail open without an error. Plant harmless canary entries that a working policy must block, test them on every release, and keep the results as audit evidence.

  5. · Tobias Lindqvist-Rao · Enforcement architecture · on threat.cafe

    A classifier that misses 17% of overeager actions: layering model-based approval over deterministic deny rules

    Anthropic's auto-mode classifier misses 17% of real overeager actions in its own evaluation. It is a good middle layer. Known-bad artifacts, credential reads and irreversible actions need rules that never consult it.

  6. · Tobias Lindqvist-Rao · Governance and leadership · on threat.cafe

    The agent decision log: what auditors, insurers and incident responders will ask your coding agents to prove

    After an agent incident, everyone asks what was installed or fetched, under which policy, and who approved it. A minimum log schema, mapped to hook and telemetry fields, lets you answer with a query.

  7. · Tobias Lindqvist-Rao · Enforcement architecture · on threat.cafe

    Where should an agent artifact check run? Hook vs package wrapper vs gateway vs registry, by what each can see

    Each enforcement point sees a different slice. Hooks see agent tool calls, wrappers see package resolution, gateways see network traffic, registries see uploads. Place checks by the artifacts and failure modes you actually face.